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SPELLING MURKOWSKI:  
THE NEXT ACT 
A REPLY TO FISHKIN AND LEVITT 
CHAD FLANDERS* 
 
State v. Alaska Democratic Party,1 the Alaska Supreme Court case 
that is the focus of this symposium, is in many ways a quintessentially 
“minimalist” opinion.2  It dealt closely with the facts of the case before it, 
and left many larger issues undecided.  It did not try to catalogue 
exhaustively the many reasons why voters might need assistance in 
voting, or to distinguish those reasons that were legitimate and those 
that were not.  Instead, it was deliberately vague on those conditions or 
circumstances which might lead voters to ask for and receive assistance.  
Further, the court did not even approach a general definition of 
“assistance,” or indicate what types of assistance might be generally 
permissible under the Division of Election’s broad statutory mandate to 
“assist the voter.”  It merely allowed the use of a list of write-in 
candidates when “tailored to address a voter’s request for specific 
assistance,”3 leaving relatively vague what that “tailoring” would need 
to look like.  Even the ultimate grounds of the decision were narrow.  
Although the court referenced its previous cases “regarding the 
importance of facilitating voter intent,”4 the court did not seem to rely 
on any special canons or presumptions in its opinion.  Instead, it treated 
the case as a relatively straightforward one of a statute trumping a 
regulation. 
My original Article tried to set out the issues the court was faced 
with in the Murkowski litigation, and to offer a preliminary defense of 
the particular conclusions it reached.  I think the court reached the right 
 
 *  Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School of Law.  Thanks to 
Alex Potapov, Jennifer Nov, Christopher Bradley and Joey Fishkin for comments 
on an earlier draft. 
 1. State, Div. of Elections v. Alaska Democratic Party, No S-14054, slip. op. 
(Alaska Oct. 29, 2010). 
 2. See generally, CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME (1999). 
 3. Id. at 6. 
 4. Id. at 3. 
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conclusions, and given the need for a quick decision, it not only did not 
need to reach any broader conclusions about voter assistance, it 
probably could not have.  But legal academics operate under no similar 
time constraints, and indeed they have an obligation to explore the 
larger, theoretical implications of judicial decisions: to be sure, today’s 
court may say x, but what implications does this have for future cases y 
and z?  Some questions raised in my article were subsequently dealt 
with by the court’s decision in Miller v. Treadwell,5 where the court again 
took the side of assisting the voter, this time after the election, by 
counting ballots that did not perfectly spell Murkowki’s name.  But that 
decision in many ways raises still further questions. 
Both Joey Fishkin’s and Justin Levitt’s responses deal precisely—
and thoughtfully—with the deeper questions raised by the Murkowski 
litigation.  They both wonder, in various ways, what the right way to 
think about voter assistance should be.  But they approach the issue 
from very different angles.  Fishkin focuses on the state’s obligation to 
assist voters: to what extent, and in what ways, is the state obligated to 
help voters vote?  Levitt approaches the question of voter assistance 
from nearly the opposite angle: what responsibilities do voters have in 
making sure that their vote counts, and when are they properly 
considered “at fault” when their vote is cast incorrectly?  In my brief 
response, I want to raise a few questions of my own about Fishkin’s and 
Levitt’s analysis of the right to vote. 
I.  IS VOTING A POSITIVE RIGHT? 
Fishkin takes the modest holding of the Alaska Supreme Court in 
the first Murkowski case as disclosing a deep and important truth about 
the right to vote: assistance in voting is not just an occasional thing, 
reserved to certain people at certain times; rather we all need help in 
voting from the beginning.  The right to vote requires the state to 
actually set up institutions that enable people to vote.  Without these 
institutions, there would be no vote. “The state must set up polling 
places, train workers, buy machines, print ballots,”6 he writes.  For this 
reason, Fishkin characterizes the right to vote as a positive right. 
I am reluctant to go so far as to characterize, with Fishkin, the right 
to vote as an “unambiguously positive right,”7 at least without some 
 
 5. 245 P.3d 867 (Alaska 2010).  I address the Miller decision briefly at the 
conclusion  of this essay. 
 6. Joey Fishkin, Voting as a Positive Right: A Reply to Flanders, 28 ALASKA L. 
REV.  31 (2011). 
 7. Id. at 106. 
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further argument.  I think of voting as an ambiguously positive right, in 
the following way.  It is true that the right to vote has certain 
institutional preconditions—there must be, as he says, polls and poll 
workers—but once these preconditions are met, the right to vote looks 
more like a negative right, a right not to be excluded from the franchise 
for arbitrary reasons.8  And indeed, as Fishkin recounts, this is the way 
the right to vote has historically been characterized.9 
Consider the familiar story:10 We have the franchise available on 
the state and federal levels, but women, or blacks, or the poor are 
arbitrarily excluded or barriers are put up in the way of their right to 
vote.  In order to fully realize the right to vote for all, we must eliminate 
these barriers to voting. This is a matter not of giving assistance 
(positive) but of eliminating arbitrary barriers to the right to vote 
(negative).  Or, if we still want to capture the nature of the institutional 
preconditions to the right to vote, we might put the right to vote as a 
right to equal access to the franchise.11  Equal access is not an across the 
board entitlement to have state assistance in all respects, to make sure 
that voters vote.  It is just the right against arbitrary and unjust barriers 
being put up in the way of voting, that prevent access to the ballot. 
A fascinating Alaska case from the 1990s helps make this 
distinction clear.  During the 1994 election in Alaska, the North Slope 
Borough provided voters who could show that they voted in the election 
vouchers that would pay for the gas they (supposedly) spent in getting 
to the polls.12  The Borough attempted to justify the program by saying 
that the expense of transportation to polling places might deter residents 
from voting.  As the opinion explained, “The Borough’s limited road 
system makes it difficult for residents in remote areas to reach voting 
facilities.  In some cases, snow-mobile or all-terrain vehicles are the only 
available means of transportation.”13  Fuel, the court continued, is 
“especially expensive in the Borough.”14   
The question the Alaska Supreme Court faced in Danserau v. Ulmer 
was whether such a scheme violated state and federal law on inducing 
 
 8. The right to marry might also be construed along similar lines.  The state 
supports the institution, but once it has set up the institution, it cannot deny 
access to it arbitrarily.  See Nelson Tebbe and Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access 
and the Right To Marry, 158  U. PENN. L. REV.  1375 (2010). 
 9. Fishkin, supra note 6, at 35. 
 10. For a longer version of this story, see Chad Flanders, How to Think About 
Voter Fraud (And Why), 41 CREIGHTON L. REV. 93, 110–111 (2009). 
 11. I take this term from Tebbe and Widiss, supra note 8. 
 12. Danserau v. Ulber, 903 P.3d 555 (Alaska 1995).  There was some question 
whether voters were getting over-reimbursed for the cost of their gas. 
 13. Id. at 562. 
 14. Id. 
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voters to vote for a certain candidate by pecuniary means (it held that it 
did not).15  But my purpose in raising the example is to make a narrower 
point: I do not think that we would think that such a scheme was 
mandatory in order to fulfill the Borough residents’ right to vote.  Rather, 
we might think it simply a nice thing that the Borough might permissibly 
do for its residents.  Why do we think this?  It is because the Borough is 
not preventing voters from voting by not giving them gas vouchers.  No 
one’s right to vote is violated because gas is expensive, even 
prohibitively expensive.  But imagine if the state put up actual 
roadblocks preventing Borough residents from getting to the polls; this 
presumably would be an obvious violation of the right to vote.16 
The question then becomes in the Murkowski litigation whether 
assisting voters in spelling “Murkowski” is more like giving Borough 
residents gas, or more like removing roadblocks that prevent them from 
voting.  This is a trickier question than it first appears.  Once we depart 
from the easy cases (the outright exclusion of blacks and women from 
voting) it becomes harder to define exactly what equal access does 
require.  Fishkin clearly wants to emphasize the blurriness of the line 
between removing hindrances to the right to vote and positive 
assistance, and he is right to do so.  Still, I think we might draw at least 
some distinctions. 
The disability cases, which the Alaska Supreme Court highlighted 
in its opinion,17 seem the easiest to categorize.  If a person could not 
remember Murkowski’s name because of a stroke or other disability, 
and needed assistance in spelling her name correctly, then this seems 
more like providing equality of access to the disabled voter.  It is on  par 
with providing the blind voter assistance in voting.  If we did not allow 
the blind voter assistance then it is not a case of merely not assisting the 
blind voter—we are instead putting up an obstacle to that voter.  We are 
trying to create a system in which all voters are on a level playing field, 
and the state has the obligation to level the field so that disability does 
not matter.  Helping the blind voter is not giving the blind voter a gas 
voucher; it is removing a roadblock. 
 
 15. Id. at 572. 
 16. But what if the state refused to set up polling places that were anywhere 
near the North Slope?  This would again suggest that the state was putting up 
road blocks, not merely refusing to assist voters.  As I say later, the fact that 
there are close cases does not mean that there is no line to draw, and that all 
assistance is on a par. 
 17. State v. Alaska Democratic Party, at 4–5. 
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But when we move away from disability cases (and those like it18), 
the idea that we are removing roadblocks becomes harder to sustain.  
Those who cannot spell Murkowski’s name not due to any disability, 
but simply because of forgetfulness or laziness or indifference seem not 
to be asking that a roadblock be removed, but are asking that they be 
given extra help, help that other voters are not receiving.  They have 
equal access, but they want more than equal access—they want to be 
treated specially and not equally.19  It is here that I want to say that if they 
fail to remember Murkowski’s name, then it may be their fault and they 
should suffer the consequences.  It may be a hard line to draw, and 
courts or legislatures may not want to draw it (we do not want poll 
workers guessing as to who has forgotten due to disability and who has 
forgotten due to laziness)—but this does not mean that there isn’t a line 
there. 
II. BLAMING THE VOTER? 
But this brings us squarely to the question which Levitt raises in his 
contribution to the symposium, which deals with the issue of voter fault.  
When voters fail to follow instructions to the letter, are we right to 
blame them and let them face the consequences?20  Suppose, to take the 
Murkowski litigation as an example, a voter has been able to receive 
assistance in spelling Murkowski’s name but fails to ask for it, and ends 
up misspelling Murkowski’s name.  Should the same voter be able to 
appeal, post-election, to a liberal standard in counting write-in ballots? 
On the one hand, we might think that this voter is getting two bites 
at the apple. He gets one try to cast a valid write-in ballot on his own 
(but with assistance available from poll-workers), and if he fails, he gets 
a second try, this time relying on the mercy of the ballot-counters to 
correct his mistake.  On the other hand, we may wonder what purpose it 
serves to punish the voter for his mistake even if he bears some (or all) 
of the responsibility for that mistake.  Does the punishment of throwing 
out his vote match the severity of his crime, which is at worst laziness?  
If the voter intent is manifest in the ballot he’s cast, we might conclude 
that there is little reason why we should ignore that intent, when such a 
weighty interest—the right to vote—hangs in the balance. 
 
 18. Including, especially, those involving language barriers.  See id. at 5 & 
n.10. 
 19. For a similar worry in the case of photo identification laws, see Flanders, 
supra note 10, at 142–45. 
 20. Justin Levitt, Fault and the Murkowski Voter: A Reply to Flanders, 28 ALASKA 
L. REV. 41 (2011). 
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The problem is that elections need governing rules, and sometimes 
voters will fail to follow those rules.  It would be practically impossible 
to have an ad hoc ruling every time a voter failed to follow one of the 
rules in an election, to see whether the violation was severe enough to 
warrant the disfranchisement of the voter.21  This need for rules that 
sometimes may not be observed is the perhaps darker side of Fishkin’s 
point that the state must set up election institutions.  As the Alaska 
Supreme Court has recognized “election laws will inevitably burden the 
right to vote.”22  Some voters will fail to carry those burdens, and the 
result will be that their votes will not be counted, and rightfully so. 
For example, the Alaska court held in Cissna v. Stout that a voter 
who sent in his absentee ballot a day after the election could not have his 
vote counted in the election.23  We can stipulate (as the court did) that 
the day-late ballot was perfectly clear about the voter’s intent and even 
that the voter made a good-faith effort to be on time.24  Still, the 
statutory language was straightforward and unambiguous in setting out 
a deadline, and the vote did not count.25 
The language of voter fault may be too heavy to use in this context, 
and here I think Levitt is on to something.  But when we consider cases 
like the forgetful absentee voter, I am moved in the direction of saying 
that sometimes voter error will have the consequence of voter 
disenfranchisement, and saying the voter is at “fault” is indeed proper.  
It is not as if we have set out to punish the voter. However, failure to 
follow the rules in some contexts will inevitably require 
disenfranchisement. This is the upshot of having rules.  If the language 
of fault seems too fraught, we might instead think of voter “mistake”—
but the consequence of either phrasing is the same: the voter at fault, or 
the voter who makes a mistake, will not have his vote counted. 
But what mistakes should carry with them the penalty of a lost 
vote, and which mistakes should be forgiven and characterized as “mere 
mistakes” that should not disenfranchise voters?26  We can set out clear 
cases on either side, with one side being occupied by the absent minded-
absentee voter, and the other side being occupied by instances where 
 
 21. Although some Alaska Supreme Court cases have this feel; see the 
dizzying number of challenges considered in Fischer v. Stout, 741 P.2d 217 
(Alaska 1987). 
 22. Sonneman v. State, 969 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1998). 
 23. 931 P.2d 363 (Alaska 1996). 
 24. Id. at 370 (voter made “good faith effort to vote”). 
 25. ALASKA STAT. §§15.20.203, 15.20.081(e) (2010). 
 26. See Egdmon v. State, Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Division of 
Elections, 152 P.3d 1154, 1157 (Alaska 2007) (the “voter should not be 
disenfranchised because of mere mistake, but [the voter’s] intention should 
prevail”). 
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official fault causes a ballot’s not being tallied. The Alaska Supreme 
Court has made clear that when an election official’s error results in a 
vote being not counted, this should not stand27—although even here 
apparently there are limits.28 
Where does this leave the voter who misspells Murkowski even 
though assistance was available to him at the time he voted?  There is a 
clear sense in which the voter is at fault—we cannot blame election 
officials for not positively inquiring of each voter whether he or she needs 
assistance.  But not all voter faults should be treated equally.  A stray 
ballot mark where the voter’s intent is otherwise clear seems 
forgivable.29  Indeed, “fault” in this context seems less about assigning 
individual blame than about assessing what the consequences would be 
of widespread tolerance of the particular failing.  As the court said in 
Cissna, there are good public policy reasons (especially an interest the 
finality of election results30) to not let people mail in their absentee 
ballots any old time of their choosing. 
I think to decide on the value of placing the burden on the voter to 
spell Murkowski correctly, we need to dwell more on two factors that 
Levitt considers only briefly: the cost of counting mistaken write-in 
ballots, not just in the Murkowski election, but in future elections, and 
also the language of the statute indicating how write-in ballots should 
be cast, if they are to be counted.31  Both of these factors move us away 
from focusing on the fault of the individual voter, and more on the costs 
of allowing voter error to be excused, and on the rules of the game as the 
legislature has set them up.  If the costs are high and the rules are clear 
and fair, then we may simply have to let the consequences of the 
mistake lie with the voter.  If the costs are low and the rules are 
ambiguous, the case for excusing the voter becomes stronger. 
 
 27. See, e.g., Willis v. Thomas, 600 P.2d 1079, 1087 (Alaska 1979) (errors 
“solely on the part of election officials” will not invalidate ballots).  Carr v. 
Thomas, was also a case that involved election official error (which is why it may 
be misleading to cite it in cases where there is at least some fault on behalf of the 
voter, such as in the Murkowski cases). 586 P.2d 622 (1978). 
 28. In Finkelstein v. Stout, the Alaska Supreme Court invalidated thirty-two 
absentee ballots that were cast illegally, but due to official error. 774 P.2d 786, 
792 (Alaska 1989). The court held that in some cases, where “the vote violates 
provisions deigned to insure the integrity of the electoral process,” the state has 
an interest in rejecting the vote regardless of the source of the vote’s illegality. Id. 
 29. See Edgmon, 152 P.3d at 1157. 
 30. Indeed, in Cissna the candidate had lost the election by one vote.  It 
seems right that in that case an absentee ballot filed after election day should be 
thrown out.  Cissna, 931 P.2d at 364. 
 31. See Levitt, supra note 20, at 44, 49. 
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In Miller v. Treadwell, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
liberally construing the statute regarding write-in ballots, so that if the 
voter intent was discernable from the ballot, the vote should count.32  I 
am not sure this is the correct decision, although I cannot defend my 
suspicion here.  Levitt brackets in his article the question of whether 
there were “valid reasons” for strictly construing the statute.33  Those 
reasons might have been the statute itself and the clarity of its 
language,34 and the absence of any evidence of bad legislative intent in 
requiring voters to spell correctly and exactly the name of the 
candidate.35  The conclusion in Miller seems at the end of the day 
defensible; at the same time, it strikes me as a much closer call than the 
decision in the first Murkowski case.36 
But the Miller decision did bring to a close the first round of the 
Murkowski write-in affair.  It is now the legislature’s turn to revisit the 
statutes implicated in the litigation.  This seems appropriate: the reasons 
I listed above—concerns with the cost of a certain rule, and the clarity or 
vagueness of the rule itself—are properly legislative concerns.  With the 
first act over, it is now time for the Legislature (advised by the Division 
of Elections) to take center stage in the next act.37 
 
 
  
 
 
 32. Miller, slip op. at 4. 
 33. Levitt, supra note 20, at 50. 
 34. The Alaska Supreme Court has adopted a “clear statement rule” 
regarding statutes that potentially disenfranchise voters.  See Carr v. Thomas, 
586 P.2d at 626–27 (voters not morally at fault cannot be deprived of a right to 
vote unless the legislature has clearly said so).  But presumably—as with the 
case of the absentee ballot rule in Cissna —the clear statement can simply be the 
rule set down by the legislature in the first place.  It need not be the case that the 
legislature has to both lay down a clear rule and say (in a separate sentence) that 
it really means it. 
 35. I expand on this later point in an unpublished article, Veil of Ignorance 
Rules in Election Law (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (draft on file with 
author). 
 36. A final point: even if all contested write-in votes were to have been 
thrown out, Miller still would have lost.  This raises the question of whether the 
Alaska Supreme Court might have properly avoided reaching the issues of 
statutory interpretation at all. 
 37. The Lt. Governor released a report in early April 2011 recommending 
that the standard for write-in ballots should be voter intent.  Several bills are 
currently pending in the Alaska legislature that would institute changes to 
counting write-in ballots.  See Report Recommends Changes to State Election 
Laws, JUNEAU EMPIRE, Apr. 2, 2011, http://juneauempire.com/state/2011-04-
02/report-recommends-changes-state-election-laws. 
